Post #36 - Open Letter to the Prime Minister: Voda.fail Goes to Canberra -

Published on 1 November 2025.

Over the past three months, Voda.fail has become more than just a campaign – it’s become a case study in how corporate silence, weak oversight, and fragmented regulation can fail ordinary Australians.

What began as a single unresolved billing error has grown into a wider public-interest investigation into how TPG Telecom (ASX:TPG) – owner of Vodafone, Felix Mobile, and iiNet – handles its customers, its data, and its accountability to shareholders.

This open letter to Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has been formally submitted through the PM’s online correspondence portal. It summarises both my personal experience and the systemic issues affecting thousands of Australians – including billing errors, privacy breaches, collection activity on disputed accounts, and misleading marketing about network coverage and emergency-service access.

⚡️ TL;DR:

This open letter to Prime Minister Anthony Albanese calls for a multi-agency investigation into TPG Telecom (ASX:TPG) – spanning privacy breaches, misleading conduct, billing and credit-management failures, and potential governance and disclosure lapses.

It follows verified evidence that Vodafone/TPG continued collection activity on disputed accounts, retained false credit and “write-off” flags, and that the TPG CEO contacted a complainant’s employer during active regulator proceedings – conduct now logged with KPMG FairCall as a whistleblower disclosure.

The campaign is grounded in the experiences of hundreds of Australians – including vulnerable and elderly customers, widows, and survivors of domestic violence – who have reported ongoing billing, credit, network, and complaint-handling failures across Vodafone and TPG brands. Over 1.7 million people have engaged with the campaign so far. The TIO has referred the matter to its Systemic Issues Team, with a potential referral to ACMA now under consideration.

The letter urges coordinated action by the OAIC, ASIC, ACCC, ACMA, and ASX Compliance, stronger cross-regulator oversight, and better protection for consumers from systemic misconduct by major telcos.

Open Letter to the Prime Minister

To: The Hon. Anthony Albanese MP

Prime Minister of Australia

Subject: Urgent Request for Multi-Agency Investigation into TPG Telecom (ASX:TPG) – Privacy, Consumer and Disclosure Failures

Dear Prime Minister,

I am writing to raise a serious governance and consumer-protection concern involving TPG Telecom Limited (ASX:TPG) – one of Australia’s largest listed telecommunications companies – and to request your office’s attention regarding corporate accountability, privacy enforcement, and whistleblower protections.

This matter extends well beyond an individual billing complaint. It reveals systemic failings in governance, data accuracy, complaint handling, oversight at the senior-executive level of a listed company, and disclosure – issues that extend beyond a single customer and into market integrity.

It exposes significant gaps in how agencies such as the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (TIO), Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC), ASX Compliance, and ASIC coordinate their roles when serious consumer and governance issues overlap.

1. Background

I operate a small consumer-awareness website, www.voda.fail, which documents verified systemic billing and data-handling failures at Vodafone/TPG Telecom. The site contains primary evidence – written correspondence, billing data, and internal responses from TPG’s executive and legal teams – confirming both the existence of an error and the company’s refusal to correct it.

Since launching, hundreds of Australians have shared similar experiences. Social media posts about these issues have reached more than half a million people, driving new TIO complaints and attracting scrutiny from journalists, analysts, and investors. This is public-interest advocacy, not commercial activity. My employer is entirely unrelated to the telecommunications sector and has never been mentioned publicly.

1A. Public Impact and Regulatory Escalation

Since publication, the Voda.fail campaign has reached more than 2 million views across web, social, and media channels, with hundreds of Australians coming forward to share parallel experiences of billing errors, non-compliant credit management activity, poor network performance, and unresolved privacy concerns.

These include elderly consumers, widows, and survivors of domestic and financial abuse, many of whom report being left disconnected, overcharged, or pursued for debts during active Ombudsman cases. The overwhelming response underscores that this is not an isolated incident, but part of a systemic pattern of governance and consumer-protection failure within Vodafone/TPG Telecom’s operations.

In response to the growing evidence base, the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (TIO) has escalated the matter to its Systemic Issues Team for assessment, citing potential industry-wide implications. This referral may be further elevated to the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) for formal investigation into systemic and compliance failures under the Telecommunications Act 1997 and TCP Code.

This escalation reflects mounting public frustration with Vodafone and TPG Telecom’s disregard for accountability, the persistence of data inaccuracies, and the absence of transparency in regulatory disclosure despite the matter’s clear public-interest significance.

2. The Concerning Conduct

In early October, the CEO of TPG Telecom personally contacted my employer to ‘discuss me and resolve the issue’ while my matter was under active review by the TIO, OAIC, and ASX Compliance.

The call was unsolicited, made outside official complaint or legal pathways, and unrelated to my employment. It was verified by my employer in writing and has been formally logged with KPMG FairCall, TPG’s independent whistleblower service, which accepted it as a valid disclosure. TPG’s senior management has not denied making the contact.

To date, there has been no ASX announcement or public clarification addressing this conduct or its governance implications, despite the incident being market-sensitive given its regulatory and reputational impact.

Beyond my own experience, many Australians have reported similar issues – including billing errors, aggressive debt-collection activity, poor coverage, and even difficulty accessing emergency services such as 000. These concerns have been covered by ABC News and 2GB Radio, which described the situation as “Robodebt Mark II” and observed that “it shouldn’t be this hard to get the billing right.”

The TIO Systemics Team is now reviewing these patterns for potential referral to the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA), underscoring that these are not isolated incidents but symptoms of a broader structural breakdown in consumer protection, complaint handling, and corporate accountability.

3. Why This Matters

When the CEO of an ASX-listed entity contacts a complainant’s workplace during active regulatory proceedings, it ceases to be “customer service” and becomes a governance event.

Once executive conduct intersects with live regulator processes and potential price-sensitivity, it triggers obligations beyond customer care and squarely into ASIC/ASX territory.

This conduct raises serious concerns under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), including:

ss 180–184 – directors’ and officers’ duties of care, diligence, and good faith;
ss 182–183 – misuse of position or information;
s 674 – continuous-disclosure obligations for market-sensitive information;
s 1041H – misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to securities;
s 1308(2) – false or misleading statements to regulators or auditors;
Part 9.4AAA – whistleblower protections.

It also engages ASX Listing Rules 3.1 and 3.1B, which require immediate disclosure of any information a reasonable person would expect to have a material effect on share price. Prolonged silence in the face of material developments raises questions about compliance with continuous disclosure obligations.

Given national media coverage and active regulator correspondence, any continuing non-disclosure may contravene LR 3.1 and s 674 of the Corporations Act. If material information remained undisclosed during this period, ASIC may consider whether s 1041H (misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to financial products) obligations were met.

If material information remained undisclosed during this period, ASIC may consider whether continuous disclosure obligations under s 674 of the Corporations Act and ASX Listing Rule 3.1 were met, and whether s 1041H (misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to financial products) is engaged.

The continuing absence of disclosure, despite these matters being known to TPG’s Group Legal, Corporate Affairs, External Communications and Executive Resolutions teams, raises serious questions about internal oversight, board accountability, and market integrity.

4. Privacy and Regulatory Concerns

If the CEO obtained my employment details through internal records or customer data, that may constitute a serious interference with privacy under s13G of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).

Relevant provisions include:

APP 1, 6, 10, 12, 13: transparency, accuracy, access, and correction obligations;
s52(1)(a)(iii): OAIC power to issue binding determinations and compensation orders;
s55A: publication of determinations in the public interest.

The OAIC currently has an active intake on this matter. However, the fragmented nature of privacy, consumer, and corporate oversight creates regulatory blind spots that large corporations can exploit with impunity.

5. Legal and Regulatory Breaches (Summary)

These issues collectively indicate potential breaches across at least six statutory frameworks:

Telecommunications Consumer Protections (TCP) Code (C628:2019)

Clauses 2.5.3, 4.1, 8.2-8.6: breaches of billing accuracy, complaint handling, and prohibitions on debt collection during TIO disputes.

Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth)

ss101–105: licence conditions on accurate billing and compliance with industry codes;
s581(1)(d): Ministerial power to direct ACMA to investigate systemic issues;
s582(1): false or misleading information to a regulator.

Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and Service Standards) Act 1999 (Cth)

Part 6 & s128: empowers ACMA to issue enforceable directions to telcos breaching registered industry codes.

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (Schedule 2 – Australian Consumer Law)

s18: misleading or deceptive conduct;
s21: unconscionable conduct;
s23: unfair contract terms (vague “commercial discretion” clauses);
s29: false or misleading representations;
s60–62: lack of due care and skill in providing services.
Part XIB, ss151AJ–151BE: telecommunications-specific powers for ACMA to act on systemic misleading conduct.

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)

ss180–184: directors’ duties of care, diligence, and proper purpose;
s1041H: misleading conduct relating to securities;
s674: failure to disclose market-sensitive regulatory and reputational risk;
s1308(2): false or misleading statements to regulators;
s912A: analogy to financial-services duty to maintain adequate risk and compliance arrangements.

ASX Listing Rules & Corporate Governance Principles

Rules 3.1, 3.1B, 8.4 – continuous disclosure and truthful market statements;
Principles 4 & 7 – internal audit, risk, and governance oversight failures.

Additionally, market commentary has raised concerns that the Felix Mobile brand may be making promotional or strategic statements to investors and the public that warrant scrutiny under Australia’s continuous-disclosure regime.

If TPG or its subsidiaries have made investor-facing claims implying that Felix’s underlying economics and fundamentals mirror those of Netflix – without full disclosure of known regulatory, complaint, or governance risks – this could engage s 674 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and ASX Listing Rules 3.1 / 3.1B. Moreover, if such statements influenced trading while material adverse information remained undisclosed, s 1041H (misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to financial products) and s 1043A (insider trading) may also become relevant.

In investor communications and analyst commentary, Felix Mobile and other prepaid offerings have occasionally been positioned as comparable to subscription-SaaS models such as Netflix. Yet if churn rates are several multiples higher than Netflix’s, average customer tenure less than half, and acquisition-cost pay-back never achieved in some cohorts, the analogy becomes materially misleading. Additionally, while Netflix subscribers often cancel and later reactivate without incurring incremental customer acquisition costs, Felix customers frequently sign up again as “new” users to access new-customer promotions or discounts – effectively resetting CAC and worsening the business model’s underlying LTV-to-CAC fundamentals.

This all raises questions around overall profitability, revenue sustainability, margin permanence, and recurring-revenue reliability. If TPG has made public representations suggesting profitability, customer-lifetime-value (LTV), or recurring-revenue stability comparable to Netflix, without adequate disclosure of these underlying metrics and risks, this may breach continuous-disclosure obligations and consumer-market fairness principles.

When TPG or market analysts describe Felix Mobile or prepaid telco services as “the Netflix of telecoms” or “a subscription-based SaaS-style business,” it risks overstating the quality and durability of its revenue base.

Felix may inherently rely on:

High churn and reactivation cycles;
Auto-recharge mechanisms (not binding contracts);
Low customer-lifetime value (LTV); and
High customer-acquisition costs (CAC) per active user.
High average data usage on “unlimited” plans, where increased consumption directly erodes margins – a cost dynamic entirely unlike Netflix’s scalable content model.

So while the billing cadence may resemble SaaS, the economic substance does not.

Such comparisons, though superficially appealing, are potentially misleading to investors – especially under s 674 and s 1041H of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).

While no allegation of misconduct is made, this dimension highlights a broader market-integrity risk stemming from selective disclosure, aggressive narrative management, and inadequate governance oversight.

Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)

APPs 1, 6, 10, 12, 13; s13G; s52; s55A: repeated interferences with privacy and failure to correct data.
Post-2022 amendments, serious or repeated interferences with privacy (s 13G) can attract significant civil penalties per contravention.

TIO Scheme & Terms of Reference

Clauses 5.1-6.1: obligation to participate in good faith and refer systemic issues to ACMA.

6. Requested Action

I respectfully request that your office:

1. Refer and request formal investigations

by the OAIC, ASIC, ACMA, ACCC and ASX Compliance into TPG Telecom Limited (ASX:TPG) for potential systemic breaches spanning the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), Australian Consumer Law (Schedule 2, Competition and Consumer Act 2010), Telecommunications Consumer Protections (TCP) Code, Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), and ASX Listing Rules 3.1 / 3.1B.

Key issues include:

Privacy Act non-compliance: delayed and obstructed access requests (five-month delay vs 30-day statutory limit) and excessive $5,088 access fee – contrary to APP 12.8 and 12.9.
‎
Retention of inaccurate personal information: “write-off” and “overdue” flags knowingly maintained after admitted billing errors – a breach of APP 10 (accuracy) and APP 13 (correction).
‎
Misuse of exemptions: APP 12.3(h)/(j) (“unlawful activity” and “commercial sensitivity”) improperly invoked to conceal standard customer records.
‎
Debt collection during TIO complaints: breaches of TCP Code cl 2.5.3 and ACCC/ASIC RG 96.
‎
False or misleading statements to the TIO and media about case status, privacy requests, and account correction (ACL ss 18 & 29).
‎
Governance failures: possible breaches of directors’ duties (ss 180–184 Corporations Act) and continuous-disclosure obligations (LR 3.1 / 3.1B, s 674), following CEO contact with a complainant’s employer and omission of key consumer-risk metrics from investor materials.

2. Direct a coordinated regulator review

(Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Australian Communications and Media Authority, Australian Securities & Investments Commission, Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, and ASX Compliance) addressing:

Inconsistent and misleading credit-decline explanations: potential breaches of Privacy Act (APP 10, APP 13, Part IIIA/CR Code), ACL (ss 18, 29), and the TCP Code.
‎
Systemic billing and chargeback failures: $50 disputes becoming $2,000+ “debts,” duplicate reversals, and uncontrolled accounting entries – contrary to ACL s 60–62, ASIC RG 96, and TCP Code cl 4.1.
‎
Retaliation through “commercial discretion”: refusal of service post-admission of error – unconscionable under ACL s 21.
‎
False and unsubstantiated allegations of misconduct (‘altered ID’, ‘hundreds of applications’) raised before the TIO and subsequently abandoned without explanation or correction, and inconsistent with ACMA KYC obligations.
‎
Coverage and 000-service representations: marketing suggesting reliable regional coverage contrary to customer experience and national media findings (ABC, 2GB).

TIO data shows Vodafone/TPG complaint rates are materially above the ~0.4% industry baseline (internal analysis indicates ~30–67% higher depending on period and brand), evidencing widespread systemic failures requiring enforcement, not consultation.

3. Require or, where appropiate, strongly encourage TPG Telecom

to address and rectify this matter in full, including through an enforceable remediation plan overseen by the ACMA, ACCC, and OAIC. This should include:

Correction and written confirmation of all inaccurate records, removal of “write-off/overdue” flags, and apologies to affected customers.
‎
Refund of unreasonable privacy-access fees and establishment of a redacted/summary-access pathway (APP 12.8–12.9 compliance).
‎
Cessation of credit management or debt collection on disputed charges during active TIO proceedings, and an independent audit of past breaches of TCP Code 2.5.3 and RG 96.
‎
Verification and substantiation of all coverage claims, corrective advertising where necessary, and compliance with ACL ss 18 and 29.
‎
Restoration of fair service eligibility (a “re-apply without prejudice” process) and public acknowledgment of systemic errors to rebuild consumer trust.

4. Ask ASX Compliance and ASIC

to examine whether TPG’s board and officers complied with ss 180–184 and s 674 of the Corporations Act, including:

CEO contact with a complainant’s employer;
‎
Removal of key consumer metrics from investor reports;
‎
Failure to disclose material governance risks, negative media, and regulator engagement – all likely to be market-sensitive under ASX Listing Rules 3.1 / 3.1B. ASX should consider issuing a price-sensitivity query and require TPG to clarify these matters publicly.

5. Ask ACMA and the ACCC

to jointly investigate:

Systemic breaches of the TCP Code and Complaint-Handling Standard;
‎
Misleading coverage, network performance, and 000-service representations under ACL ss 18 and 29;
‎
Complaint-handling and credit-management failures across Vodafone/TPG brands; and
‎
Use of debt-collection partners during open regulatory complaints. Both regulators should consider appointing an independent compliance monitor for 12 months, reporting quarterly to Parliament.

6. Ask the OAIC

to open a targeted investigation into systemic privacy failures, including:

Unreasonable access fees (APP 12.8);
‎
Misapplied exemptions (APP 12.3(h/j));
‎
Failure to correct false “write-off” data (APP 10 & 13); and
Potential retaliatory misuse of personal information to contact or influence a complainant’s workplace. Any findings should be published under s 52 of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) to ensure transparency and precedent for similar cases.

7. Request that all regulators provide

an initial progress update to your office within 28 days, confirming coordinated investigation status and any preliminary enforcement actions.

TPG Telecom should be encouraged to confirm record correction, eligibility restoration, and apology within the same timeframe – verified by regulators.

Summary

These actions are proportionate, evidence-based, and consistent with existing ministerial powers.

They would demonstrate that privacy, consumer, and governance obligations apply equally to major listed entities, and that systemic misconduct – no matter how complex or cross-jurisdictional – will not be ignored.

7. Conclusion

This case is not about a $50 billing dispute. It is about the principle that no executive – no matter how senior – should intrude into a citizen’s workplace or personal affairs for raising legitimate concerns through proper channels.

Australians deserve assurance that consumers can seek redress without retaliation.

I appreciate your attention to this matter and stand ready to provide any supporting evidence your office may require.

Yours sincerely,

Ryan

Founder, http://www.voda.fail

Right of Reply & Disclaimer

This open letter is published in the public interest and is based on verifiable correspondence, regulatory materials, and publicly available information as at 1 November 2025.

We make no allegation or finding of law against TPG Telecom Limited, Vodafone, or their executives. Any legal breach or contravention remains a matter for determination by regulators or a court of competent jurisdiction.

The material above reflects our interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Australian Consumer Law, Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), and ASX Listing Rules as they relate to the public interest.

If TPG Telecom or any related entity believes any factual information herein is inaccurate, they are invited to contact info@voda.fail with supporting evidence. Verified corrections or clarifications will be published promptly. We will publish a dated correction note on the same page as this letter for transparency.

This post does not seek to interfere with any ongoing regulatory proceedings, commercial relationships, or lawful corporate activity. Its purpose is transparency, accountability, and constructive reform in the public interest.